May 24th 2011. A day that would seem no different
from any other held major consequences concerning the future of one of
history’s most dangerous viruses: smallpox. It was earlier this year that the
member states of the World Health Organization (WHO) met in Geneva to once more
debate-as they have since 1976-whether or not the remaining stocks of the virus
should be destroyed. The result of the
assembly was not unlike any other, as the United States and Russia once more
bullied their way into postponing the destruction of the virus for another
three years. While the tide of opposition for keeping the live virus in two
sanctioned repositories continues to grow, some have continued their support of
the United States and Russia in keeping the virus intact. One of these pieces
of support comes from the January 2011 edition of Nature. The editorial titled “Smallpox should be saved” is a clear
backing of the efforts made by the United States and Russia to secure their
virus stocks and calls for a political compromise that would allow them to do
so. This argument, while intriguing in its own right, is simply outdated and
narrow minded. Too often the article tends treat the political wants and needs
of these two member states as superior to the other 191 member states of the
World Health Organization. A much more fair and balanced insight into the
dilemma comes from Jonathan Tucker’s “Breaking the Deadlock Over Destruction of
the Smallpox Virus Stocks”. Published by the scientific journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense
Strategy, Practice, and Science in January 2011, Tucker’s article is a
chronological display of conflict that has spanned over four decades. It
becomes clear that the patience of the member states with the United States and
Russia over their desires to hold on to their WHO repositories is waning. As
such, Tucker has successfully argued that two former superpowers can no longer
hold the rest of the World Health Organization in gridlock. Efforts must be
made to reduce and eventually eliminate the stocks of smallpox to ensure global
stability and international security.
The fate of
the smallpox virus has been the topic of discussion among world powers for
almost half a century. This is a disease
that has claimed a third of its victims, amounting to hundreds of millions of
lives. It was in 1966 that the World Health Organization launched a global
campaign to purge the world of this epidemic. By 1977 the last natural outbreak
of smallpox had been contained and eradicated.
While contained accidents continued for a few more years, the WHO
recommended destroying the stocks or transferring a limited amount of them to
WHO collaboration centers in the United States and former Soviet Union. This
was 1976. The year is now 2011 and stocks of the disease still exist because
the United States and Russia refuse to give up their position that further
testing is still needed.
So why won’t
the United States and Russia compromise with the rest of the World Health
Organization? The answer is a complicated one but it lies between the node of
public health and national security. As the editorial in Nature is quick to point out, the whereabouts of all stocks of
smallpox remain clouded in mystery. It is possible that secret stocks of the
virus could be in the hands of terrorists. This threat pulls at the emotional
cords of the American people following the events of 9/11. With this in mind, Nature argues that the means of
producing biochemical warfare have increased the need to keep the smallpox
stocks that remain. Tucker himself further elaborates on this point in his own
article; stating the uneasiness of the Cold War and the information that was
leaked following its collapse as a major source of anxiety for the United
States. It was in 1992 that Ken Ailbek, a defected Soviet official, revealed
the biological warfare program of the former U.S.S.R. The details of their program were nothing
short of astonishing. Ailbek revealed that the U.S.S.E has developed a highly
lethal strain of smallpox as a weapon. This strain had been stockpiled by the
ton and shipped for delivery against the United States in the case that World
War III broke out. This however was not the only source of concern as
circumstantial evidence obtained by the CIA suggested more undeclared stocks of
smallpox could exist in countries such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, etc. There is no question this uneasiness
influenced the United States’ decision to keep their WHO stockpiles of smallpox
in order to decode the genome of the virus and prepare a vaccine in case of an
attack. However, the excuses by both governments have run stale with the other
members of the WHO and their opposition is picking up steam.
It has
become clear within the past decade that international support for keeping the
stockpiles of smallpox has almost completely died out. According to Tucker, the
stated goals of the smallpox research program have been achieved. In terms of
DNA sequencing and progress of investigative kits, continued access to live
smallpox samples is almost useless. Scientists have learned almost all they can
from the disease. Critics of this approach rationalize their thinking by
stating that further work with the live virus would aid in the development and
testing of antiviral drugs. While in theory having these drugs would be a major
milestone to the prevention of any biochemical threat, one major obstacle would
make any chance of these drugs being passed remote. The U.S Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) require an Animal model of the virus to secure approval of
drugs and vaccines. To this day, an animal model has not been produced. The
reasoning behind this is lies in the fact that smallpox is a uniquely human
disease. Critics rightfully argue that the use of a surrogate virus such as the
monkey pox would be a much better option than keeping smallpox intact. The case
for the use of monkey pox is staggering. Not only does it contain ninety
percent of the homology of smallpox, but it is far dangerous to handle. In
addition, monkey pox is already prevalent in animals (monkeys specifically,
where it gets its namesake) and prevents a much lesser risk to its human
counterparts.
The argument
against keeping stockpiles of smallpox is strong and picking up steam. Public
health officials of developing nations within Asia and Africa simply need to
invest their scarce financial and scientific resources elsewhere. Smallpox has
not been prevalent in over thirty years, while AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis
continue to disrupt society. On the home front, Tucker argues that the United States’
policy makers need to decide how much of a defensive front against the smallpox
virus they need. Russia is not capable of withholding off the scrutiny of the
entire World Health Organization without the United States. This fact implies
that Russia would have no choice but to concede to the WHO if the United States
chose to drop its opposition to the virus destruction. It is in Tucker’s belief that the United
States should finally accept a firm deadline for ending smallpox research. In
addition, it is time for the nation to destroy its stocks of smallpox, which
had been authorized by WHO to begin with. While the Nature article claims any destruction of smallpox would be purely
politically driven and symbolic, it fails to account for the unrest of the majority
of countries in the World Health Organization who are calling for the destruction
of the virus. However, the writers of the Nature article and Jonathan Tucker
have common ground: both can agree that the elimination of some of the stocks
would create some headway in a debate that has seen nothing but stalemates.
It is clear
that a consensus over the fate of one of the deadliest killers in history will
not be solved overnight. Yet the time for delay is over. With May 2011 come and
gone, and another delay on the future of this disease passed, the members of
the WHO are putting society through the same endless game year after year.
These stocks should be destroyed, if for nothing else just to promote stability
between the members of the WHO. An organization that is driven by only two of
its one hundred ninety three members is not fair and just. Instead, it is a
mockery of democracy and teeters on absolute rule. Concessions have to be made
by the United States and Russia in the upcoming years to prevent not only
biochemical harm, but to protect international unity.
Bibliography
"Smallpox Should Be Saved : Nature : Nature Publishing Group." Nature Publishing Group : Science Journals, Jobs, and Information. Web. 11 Oct. 2011. <http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v469/n7330/full/469265a.html>.
D. A. Henderson. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. June 2011, 9(2): 163-168. doi:10.1089/bsp.2011.0011.
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